The Christian Ethics of Dante's Purgatory by Corbett, George
George Corbett, ‘The Christian Ethics of Dante’s Purgatory’ 
(Medium Ævum, forthcoming)
It might appear straightforward, on a first reading, that Dante’s Purgatory represents a penitential 
journey  guided by  Christian ethics to God. For most of the poem’s history, indeed, Purgatory has 
been read broadly in this way. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, a parallel 
interpretation emerged. Influenced by  Dante’s dualistic theory of man’s two ethical goals (one 
temporal and one eternal), many scholars have argued that Purgatory represents a secular journey 
guided by philosophical principles to a temporal happiness. This article presents three major 
counterarguments to the secular reading of Purgatory, a reading proposed most powerfully in recent 
scholarship  by John A. Scott’s monograph Dante’s Political Purgatory.1  First, it  proposes a new 
way to read the poem as informed by Dante’s dualistic theory which does not entail a forced reading 
of Purgatory  in overly political terms. Secondly, it demonstrates how Dante forged his vision of 
Purgatory through two areas of distinctively  Christian theory and practice which had risen to 
particular prominence in the thirteenth century: the newly crystallised doctrine of Purgatory and the 
tradition of the seven capital vices (or deadly sins) in penitential ethics.2 Thirdly, it argues that the 
region embodies an explicit re-orientation from natural to supernatural ethics, from pagan to 
Christian exempla, and from this world to the heavenly city. Where Scott has argued for a ‘political 
Purgatory’, an ethical journey guided by ‘justice and the teachings of philosophy’ towards a secular 
goal, this article presents afresh, therefore, a ‘theological Purgatory’, a moral pilgrimage guided by 
distinctively Christian ethics towards God and the beatitudo vitae aeternae.3
READING THE COMMEDIA IN DUALISTIC TERMS
According to Dante’s dualistic theory  – elucidated most explicitly in his Latin prose work the 
Monarchia – man has two ethical journeys in this life: a journey to a secular happiness achievable 
through following the teachings of the philosophers and the natural virtues (the domain of the Holy 
Roman Empire and temporal power); and a journey to an eternal beatitude achievable through 
following the teachings of divine revelation and the theological virtues (the domain of the Church 
and spiritual power).4 Dante’s distinction between the lex naturalis and the lex divina, although not 
ubiquitous in thirteenth-century  thought, is a feature of those scholastic authors committed to the 
recuperation of neo-Aristotelian philosophy.5  But whereas St Thomas Aquinas, for example, 
integrates and subordinates the order of nature to the order of grace, Dante’s strategy of two 
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autonomous ethical goals emphasises distinction and separation rather than integration.6 This leads 
to three problematic ethical implications: it  potentially relegates the function of Christianity solely 
to man’s eternal destiny in the next life; the intrinsic perfectibility of human nature appears to 
render ‘healing grace’ (gratia sanans) redundant, with the implication that only ‘elevating 
grace’ (gratia elevans) is theoretically necessary for man; and it establishes a dichotomy and 
tension between man’s pursuit of an earthly goal and his, apparently competing, pursuit of an 
eternal goal.7  The political ramifications are correspondingly problematic. Where other Christian-
Aristotelian authors advocated a progressive via media which mediated between temporal and 
spiritual power, Dante takes the distinction between homo naturalis and homo Christianus to an 
extreme.8  He thereby justifies the autonomy of empire and Church which, in his view, 
independently derive their authority directly from God. Dante’s radical dualism, particularly given 
the extreme theocratic pretensions of the contemporary papacy, could not  but suffer rebuke.9 Only 
six years after Dante’s death, the Monarchia suffered a rebuttal by the Dominican Guido Vernani; 
two years later, in 1329, it was publicly burned by the Pope’s representative in northern Italy, and it 
was subsequently placed, in 1554, on the Vatican index of prohibited books, only  to be removed in 
1881.10 
 It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that  a dualistic reading of Dante’s Commedia is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. The early commentators and readers, right up  to the twentieth 
century, show little regard for the Monarchia (with only limited reading of the Convivio) – and little 
attention to Dante’s dualism – in their interpretation of the poem’s moral structure. Leaving aside 
the restricted early  readership of the Monarchia and the Convivio, it is understandable that the early 
Dante enthusiasts who commented on his poem, the first of whom included his sons Pietro and 
Jacopo d’Alighieri, shied away from reading the Commedia in light of this extreme dualism.11 But 
even much of twentieth-century  Dante scholarship, with scarce need to protect  Dante’s poem in this 
way, sought nonetheless to limit this dualism to Dante’s Latin and vernacular prose works 
(marginalised as chronologically earlier ‘minor works’). Thus Bruno Nardi, a dominant scholar in 
this tradition, claimed that ‘In the Commedia there is no more trace of the “two final ends” of the 
Monarchia.’12  Kenelm Foster and Etienne Gilson, acute readers of philosophical heterodoxy in 
Dante’s prose works, were still keen to emphasise that ‘the Comedy is quite another matter’, and 
that its subject ‘is theological – the final aims of man (ultima regna)’.13  The compositional 
chronology  underlining this view – that Dante’s Monarchia represents a dualistic stage in his 
intellectual trajectory  that  the poet left behind when he began writing the Commedia – has, 
however, been systematically refuted by  modern philological evidence which dates the Monarchia 
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to the last few years of his life when the greater part of the Commedia was already written. Prue 
Shaw has argued convincingly that ‘there seems no good reason to doubt’ the authenticity  of ‘the 
cross-reference in Book I to the Paradiso’ and, therefore, that the Monarchia was written ‘certainly 
no earlier than 1314 and possibly [during] the very last  years of its author’s life’.14 Further recent 
historical and contextual arguments have corroborated Shaw’s thesis. They  have narrowed the 
dating of the Monarchia to after 1316 and, most probably, to the years 1317-1318.15
 This new evidence has encouraged a dualistic reappraisal of the poem and, also, a revision 
of the dominant critical approach which tended to view the relationship  between Dante’s prose 
works and the Commedia in terms of authorial palinode.16 At this important interpretative juncture, 
however, I believe that  Dante criticism has taken a wrong turn. Scholars who have tried to read the 
Commedia in light of Dante’s dualism have simply equated the secular happiness – the paradisus 
terrestris delineated in the Monarchia – with the Earthly  Paradise at the summit of mount 
Purgatory. Thus John A. Scott correctly observes that ‘all too often, Dante’s poem has been 
regarded exclusively  as a spiritual ascent to God, thus ignoring the totality of the poet’s message, 
which is bent on leading humanity to both its goals, the one set firmly in this world (Virgil/Emperor 
→ Earthly Paradise) and the other providing salvation and eternal beatitude’.17 However he jumps 
to what is, in my view, the wrong conclusion: ‘the answers, obvious as they are, need to be stated: 
yes, the Earthly  Paradise is indeed to be found there, situated above Purgatory proper, and it is 
Virgil, the Aristotelianized poet of imperial Rome, who guides Dante there’.18 On this reading, the 
summit of Dante’s Purgatory represents not spiritual beatitude but rather secular, earthly  happiness: 
‘that very  same Earthly Paradise, which for Dante reflected the happiness attainable through Justice 
and the teachings of philosophy’.19 
 As Nicola Fosca points out, a reading which equates the secular goal of Dante’s Monarchia 
with the Earthly Paradise at  the summit of Purgatory is held by ‘molti dantisti’ and sustained by  the 
authoritative Bosco-Reggio and Chiavacci Leonardi commentaries. She concludes not unreasonably 
that the Monarchia has had, thus far, a negative influence on the exegesis of the Commedia.20 
Scott’s own argument draws, in particular, on the thesis of Charles S. Singleton, an influential 
earlier twentieth-century proponent of a similar dualistic reading. Like Scott, Singleton argues that 
Dante-character on reaching the summit  of mount Purgatory attains only  the ‘rule of reason over the 
lower parts of the soul, of which Aristotle and Plato spoke’.21  Singleton also similarly  maps the 
scheme of the Monarchia onto the Mount of Purgatory: ‘For in the poem is not Eden the first goal, 
and does Virgil not guide to Eden by  the natural light of the philosophers? [...] is not the celestial 
paradise the end to which Beatrice leads, as the light of grace and revelation [...]? So that here too, 
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in respect to the second goal, treatise and poem would seem to agree.’22  Nonetheless Singleton 
recognises a flaw in such simple mapping: in the poem, unlike in the treatise, the first path is clearly 
subordinated to the second and leads to Beatrice.23 Singleton is thereby constrained to present two 
Edens: in the Earthly Paradise, Leah and Rachel initially represent the active and contemplative 
aspects of a happiness attainable through natural philosophy (and the guidance of Virgil); they are 
then transfigured on the arrival of Beatrice: ‘Virgil leads to a justice which the philosophers had 
discerned and he leads no further. Then beyond the stream, with Beatrice, come the four virtues 
which are the true perfection of the active life, that is, true justice. A Leah who is a perfected Leah 
thus comes with Beatrice. And so it must be with contemplation.’24  Awkward interpretative 
complications thereby appear in what – at first – might seem an ‘obvious’ reading.  
 Dualistic readings which equate the Earthly Paradise of Purgatory  with the secular happiness 
delineated in the Monarchia, furthermore, have led to some interpretations entirely at  odds with the 
commentary  and critical traditions. Thus Peter Armour’s re-interpretation of the griffin 
(traditionally  identified as a figure for Christ) as the ‘supreme temporal guide of mankind on earth 
[...] the Empire alone, the Empire of Rome’ is underpinned by his conviction that the Earthly 
Paradise in Purgatory depicts ‘the first of mankind’s two God-given goals – that happiness in this 
life which, as every reader of Dante knows, is not in his opinion in any  way within the sphere of 
competence of the Church’.25  John A. Scott, in similar vein, berates the Enciclopedia Dantesca 
which ‘still reports that “All the commentators, both ancient and modern, are agreed in recognizing 
Jesus Christ in the griffin”’.26  But Scott’s motive for a different interpretation is similarly 
underpinned by his identification of the Earthly Paradise at the summit of Purgatory  with Dante’s 
secular goal: ‘It would surely have been strange if, in that very  same Earthly Paradise, which for 
Dante reflected the happiness attainable through Justice and the teachings of philosophy, the poet 
had placed no signifier of the imperial office and its divinely appointed mission to guide the human 
race, humana civitas, to the beatitudo huius vitae.’27  For it is not at all strange if the Earthly 
Paradise at the summit of Purgatory is not the ‘very same Earthly Paradise’ depicted in the 
Monarchia. Far from being obvious, Scott’s dualistic reading requires an interpretation at odds both 
with the wider medieval context and with the commentary tradition of the Purgatorio.28 
 There is nonetheless another way to read the poem in dualistic terms which does not entail 
such revision of traditional interpretations of Purgatory. I would argue that Dante’s Commedia is 
indeed underpinned by his dualistic theory but that Dante represents man’s secular goal not in the 
Earthly Paradise at the summit of Purgatory but rather in his theologically original limbo of the 
virtuous pagans (Inferno, iv.67-151). In the Monarchia, Dante depicts man’s path to his temporal 
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goal as directed by philosophical teachings which are to be put into practice through the moral and 
intellectual virtues (‘per phylosophica documenta venimus, dummodo illa sequamur secundum 
virtutes morales et intellectuales operando’ (Mon., III.xv.8)). The early commentators of Inferno IV 
unanimously interpret the seven walls encircling the noble castle of Dante’s limbo to allegorically 
represent philosophical teaching (most commonly the seven liberal arts) by which the rational soul 
liberates itself from the sensual appetite.29  Dante-character then encounters, within a beautiful 
landscape which directly alludes to Virgil’s Elysian fields, exemplars of the moral and intellectual 
virtues. The first noble pagan named is Electra, the mythical founder of Troy and the root of the 
Trojan and Roman race which, for Dante, historically  instantiates the true flower of moral virtue.30 
Amongst the ‘spiriti magni’ of the ‘filosofica familia’, Aristotle – the philosopher and the exemplar 
of human intellectual perfection – holds reign: ‘il maestro di color che sanno’ (Inferno, iv. 119-32). 
Dante thereby  represents the happiness of this life (‘beatitudinem scilicet huius vite’) which consists 
in man’s natural perfection in its active and contemplative aspects, the operation of the moral and 
intellectual virtues (‘virtutes morales et intellectuales operando’).31
 Scholars heretofore have tended to start from the Commedia and then either, like Nardi, fail 
to see any trace of the dualism of the Monarchia or, like Scott, project Dante’s dualistic theory  of 
two ethical goals on to the – apparently obvious – two end-points of Dante-character’s journey: the 
Earthly Paradise at the summit of Purgatory, and Paradise itself. However if, by contrast, we 
consider Dante-poet – fully  committed to a dualistic vision of man’s two ethical goals (as the later 
dating of the Monarchia confirms) – setting out to write the Commedia, we can easily imagine him 
confronted with a stark problem and paradox: how to represent a secular, this-worldly goal in a 
poem which depicts an other-worldly afterlife? In this light, Dante’s innovative creation of the 
region of the virtuous pagans becomes clearly  understandable. Regardless of their literal destiny 
and apparently unjustified deprivation of beatitude (the undeniably important focus of most 
scholarly work on this area of limbo), the virtuous pagans serve, for Dante, a far more urgent 
allegorical purpose because they respond precisely  to this critical exigency. That is, Dante uses the 
historical figure of the virtuous pagan – to whom the spiritual goal, divine revelation, and the 
institutional Church were of course unavailable – to figuratively represent secular human 
flourishing in a poem which literally depicts the afterlife. 
 Political readings of Purgatory in terms of philosophical principles have been motivated, at 
least in part, by the attempt to map Dante’s dualistic theory onto the eschatology  of the Commedia. 
Even on their own terms, such dualistic readings – where the secular goal of Dante’s Monarchia is 
equated with the Earthly Paradise at the summit of Purgatory  – seem forced into internal 
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contradictions and to yield some rather peculiar, or at the least untraditional, interpretations. By 
contrast, I have presented an alternative dualistic reading in which Dante’s limbo of the virtuous 
pagans figuratively embodies this-worldly, ethical flourishing (the temporal goal of the Monarchia). 
This interpretation has two distinct advantages: first it enables us to read the poem as informed by 
Dante’s dualistic vision. Particularly  in light of the recent philological evidence, the thesis of a 
radical shift in Dante’s intellectual trajectory away from a dualistic ethical outlook seems now 
unsustainable. It does, therefore, appear necessary to account in some way for the doctrine of two 
ethical goals (so prominent in the Monarchia) in the Commedia. The second advantage of this 
alternative dualistic interpretation is that it nonetheless defends more traditional readings of 
Purgatory. The interpretation of Dante’s limbo of the virtuous pagans, at the rim of Hell, as 
depicting Dante’s this-worldly  goal frees Purgatory and the Earthly Paradise from a forced, overly 
secular interpretation. 
 The first stage of the argument thereby removes one key obstacle to reading Purgatory  in 
terms of Christian ethics: by providing an alternative location (the limbo of the virtuous pagans) for 
Dante’s this-worldly  goal, it  shows how one can read the poem as informed by Dante’s dualistic 
theory  without reading the ethics of Purgatory as narrowly  philosophical. The second stage of the 
argument takes a different tack: a reexamination of the immediate context of and inspiration for the 
genesis of Dante’s Purgatory. In this way, I show how the moral and doctrinal context of the 
region’s ethics is distinctively Christian and cannot be viewed within the frame of philosophical 
principles.
THE GENESIS OF DANTE’S PURGATORY
An overemphasis on the originality of Dante’s vision of Purgatory may initially obscure an 
interpretation of its moral structure. After all, were we to imagine that Dante invented his depiction 
of Purgatory  in isolation, his structuring it according to philosophical principles could be 
understood as consistent with the region’s audacious novelty as a whole. There is, of course, clear 
evidence of originality. Before Dante, the doctrine of Purgatory  was not only relatively new but, in 
Jeffrey Schnapp’s words, ‘little more than a theologian’s abstraction’.32  By contrast, Dante gave 
Purgatory a precise geographical location – in the southern hemisphere at the antipodes of 
Jerusalem. Moreover, he drew a completely  new image of what this eschatological region of 
Purgatory might be like: not simply a monochrome corporeal fire but a mountain divided into 
different regions with different punishments.33  However, there is also much content which per se is 
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not original at all. If we were to recast the moral framework and much of the doctrinal material of 
Dante’s Purgatory into another medieval genre – not as a vision of the afterlife realm of Purgatory 
but as a treatise on Christian ethics, a homiletic handbook or an allegorical moral journey set in this 
life – it would appear much more familiar. That is, there are clearly discernible contexts which 
Dante uses in constructing the moral and doctrinal structure of Purgatory. I shall examine two of 
these contexts in turn: first, the newly crystallised doctrine of Purgatory and, secondly, the well-
established resources of the tradition of the seven capital vices in medieval Christian ethics. 
 Although the Church had only given an official stamp to the doctrine of Purgatory at the 
Council of Lyon in 1274, the existence of an intermediate realm, between Hell and Paradise, was 
well established by Dante’s lifetime.34  At a practical level, the suffragia mortuorum (‘masses, 
prayers, alms and pious works by  which the living assisted the souls of the dead from purgatorial 
pains’) were integral to medieval religious life.35  At a theoretical level, medieval theologians – 
citing passages from Scripture stating that sins would be tested, punished, or cancelled by fire on 
the day of judgment – had put the flesh and blood on the doctrine of Purgatory. Outside vision 
literature, however, theological description of the region remained distinctively  unimaginative: a 
purgatorial fire. Aquinas, for example, gives a clear rationale for Purgatory. Mortal sin turns man 
away from God as his ultimate end. Through repentance, sinners are ‘brought back to the state of 
charity, whereby they  cleave to God as their last end’ and, freed from the eternal punishment of 
Hell, they merit ‘eternal life’.36 Through venial sin man does not turn away from his ultimate end 
but does err with regard to the means leading him to God. Although venial sin may be expiated by 
the fervent divine love of particularly holy souls, the general rule is that venial sin, like mortal sin, 
retains the debt of temporal punishment even after due repentance.37  The primary purpose of 
penance, therefore, is to repay  this debt. In addition, however, penance has a curative purpose: the 
sinner must be cured from vice and made virtuous and holy. What, then, of a person who dies 
before being able to complete his or her penance? And what of those, all bar the most exceptional 
saints, who die before becoming holy  and virtuous if, as Aquinas states, ‘no one is admitted to the 
possession of eternal life unless he is free from all sin and imperfection’?38 The afterlife region of 
Purgatory responds, as a theological necessity, to both these questions: it completes the debt of sin 
and it cleanses the soul of imperfection. Where the intensity  of purgatorial punishment corresponds 
to the debt (the sinner’s guilt), the length corresponds to the soul’s imperfection (the ‘firmness with 
which sin has taken root in its subject’).39 The twofold pain of Purgatory – the delay  of the divine 
vision (poena damni) and the corporeal fire (poena sensus) – is thus spiritually  necessary. 
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Furthermore, as with earthly penance, this satisfaction is desired by the souls as their means to 
restore friendship with God.40 
 Dante thereby  inherited some key doctrinal points about Purgatory but, for its description, he 
inherited only a generic condition: the corporeal fire. This left him with considerable imaginative 
freedom to describe and structure his own depiction of Purgatory. Why, then, did he choose the 
tradition of the seven capital vices? It seems at first  glance an odd choice, as we might reasonably 
expect the seven vices to structure Dante’s Hell.41 But Dante does not structure Hell according to 
the vices: the vices of pride, envy and sloth are not mentioned explicitly  at all in the Inferno, and the 
other four vices (lust, gluttony, avarice, and anger) are categorised, ostensibly in line with 
Aristotle’s Ethics, as sins of incontinence, occupying just one part of Hell (and only  five of thirty-
four cantos).42 One principal reason for Dante’s choice is that the tradition of the seven capital vices 
had come to play a dominant role in thirteenth-century Christian ethics, homilies, and confessional 
practices.43  In response to the renewed emphasis on confession at the fourth Lateran Council 
(1215-16), preachers found in the theory of the seven capital vices a popular and psychologically 
productive approach to moral evil.44 The scheme is both simple for a beginner and immensely rich 
in terms of psychological depth and complexity. The focus is not only on sins committed but, 
crucially, on character traits or tendencies which need to be corrected in the Christian’s moral 
journey  in this life.45  It is natural to suppose that many Christians (Dante included) may have 
structured their own confessions through this morally transformative scheme.46 Dante could draw 
on direct literary precedents such as Brunetto Latini’s Il Tesoretto which, like the Commedia, begins 
in the wood of sin and closes with the author confessing the seven capital sins in causal order and 
admonishing his reader to do the same.47 There were also widely diffused treatises on the vices such 
as those by Aquinas and, arguably most significantly, William Peraldus.48 Moreover, the vices (and 
corresponding sets of virtues) were central to the popular Christianity of Dante’s immediate cultural 
context, as is clear from model sermons of the time or the ethical use of the vices in visual culture.49 
For example, Alain de Lille’s outline of the appropriate content (faith and morals), audience 
(public), and material (the use of authorities) in preaching, his emphasis on the use of examples 
(which make doctrine more familiar and, thereby, more efficacious), and his chapters on each of the 
vices and corresponding virtues in the overarching context  of Christian confession and penitence 
provide a telling parallel with Dante’s approach in the Purgatory.50
 In light of this wider context, we can readily understand why the penitential tradition on the 
vices appealed to Dante as he envisaged the terraces of Purgatory and not when he organised the 
circles of Hell. For penance makes sense of three key  doctrinal purposes of Purgatory: first, it 
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realigns the soul from a disordered pursuit of earthly  goods to God as its ultimate end; secondly, it 
repays the debt for sin; thirdly, it frees the soul from all vice and imperfection. These purposes are 
equally true of the Purgatorial afterlife as of Christian penance in this life (for which there was an 
extensive literature).51 Dante, therefore, projects the familiar ethical material on the seven capital 
vices onto the entirely  unfamiliar context of Purgatory. The result is, at  a literal level, the vivid 
depiction of an otherwise uncharted eschatological region – Purgatory  – and, at an allegorical level, 
the representation of Dante’s Christian ethics: the very guidance on an individual’s journey to 
spiritual salvation which Dante felt the institutional Church of his time, misdirected by its grasp of 
temporal power, was failing to administer. 
 The principal moral context underlying Dante’s vision of Purgatory  is, therefore, Christian 
penance. Purgatory literally  depicts the purging of those dead souls who merit  salvation, but it also 
allegorically depicts the penitential journey  which every Christian should undergo in this life. This 
Christian context  strongly suggests that Dante’s Purgatory is anything but a philosophically-guided 
journey  to a temporal happiness ‘of which Aristotle and Plato spoke’. The third and final stage of 
the argument, then, addresses Dante’s description of the moral order underpinning Purgatory  in the 
poem itself. I show that Purgatory’s moral order is explicitly  governed by  Christian teachings which 
entirely  surpass the natural law; it is thus inconceivable in terms of narrowly philosophical 
principles.
THE MORAL ORDER OF DANTE’S PURGATORY
Dante-poet saves his doctrinal explanation of Purgatory for the arrival of Dante-character and Virgil 
at the terrace of sloth at nightfall. As the region cannot be climbed without the light of the sun 
(allegorically without the grace of God), dusk necessitates a pause in their journey. The moral 
lesson thereby occurs at the central terrace of Purgatory and at the centre of the poem as a whole. 
The very  fact that the speaker is Virgil, rather than Beatrice, has led many  Dante scholars to 
conclude that the moral doctrine he espouses is philosophical.52 Such a view had previously been 
strengthened by  the lack of a direct source for Dante’s apparently original organisation of the vices. 
Siegfried Wenzel convincingly showed, however, that Pietro d’Alighieri’s commentary  – 
elucidating this passage of the poem – quotes, almost word for word, the innovative treatise by the 
Domincan Peraldus on the vices which employs the exact same organising principle.53  Despite 
Wenzel’s intervention, which locates the discourse within the context of penitential Christian ethics, 
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the view nonetheless persists that the doctrine espoused by Virgil is within the bounds of pagan 
thought.54 Leaving aside the issue of the speaker (Virgil), let us contest  this view on the basis of the 
discourse itself. 
 Dante sets the entire discourse on the vices within the overarching context of the 
relationship  of love between the creator and his creation, between God (‘l fattore’) and man (‘sua 
fattura’). The ethical principle is that each soul, created by God, has an inbuilt desire to return to 
Him, a principle epitomised by the opening of Augustine’s Confessions: ‘fecisti nos, Domine, ad te, 
et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te’ [God, you made us for you, and our hearts are 
restless until they  rest in you].55 As Dante highlights through the voice of Marco Lombardo in the 
previous canto, however, each soul is created in simplicity and ignorance and is thereby easily led 
astray by lesser goods from God (its chief good):
  
  ‘Esce di mano a lui che la vagheggia
 prima che sia, a guisa di fanciulla
 che piangendo e ridendo pargoleggia,
  l’anima semplicetta, che sa nulla,
 salvo che, mossa da lieto fattore,
 volontier torna a ciò che la trastulla.
  Di picciol bene in pria sente sapore;
 quivi s’inganna, e dietro ad esso corre
 se guida o fren non torce suo amore.’  (Purgatorio, xvi.85-93)
  [From the hand of him who desires it before it 
 exists, like a little girl who weeps and laughs childishly,
  the simple little soul comes forth, knowing nothing except that,
 set in motion by a happy Maker, it gladly turns to what amuses it
  Of some lesser good it first tastes the flavour; there it is deceived 
 and runs after it, if a guide or rein does not turn away its love.] 
Dante states that the soul’s love can be disordered in two main ways: the love of an evil (‘per male 
obietto’) or the unmeasured love of a good (‘o per troppo o per poco di vigore’).56  Having 
established that the evil loved cannot be directed against oneself or against God, Dante concludes 
that it must be directed against one’s neighbour. Pride, envy and anger are thus understood as three 
ways by  which we come to love the evil of, which is to hate, our neighbour. Dante locates the origin 
of the other four capital vices in the second kind of disordered love whereby the soul does not love 
its neighbour’s evil but, rather, seeks the chief good in a defective manner (with too much or too 
little vigour). Sloth is not laziness per se, therefore, but the distinctive failure to sufficiently  love 
God: it  is unmeasured love by  deficiency. The final three vices – avarice, gluttony and lust – are 
forms of excessive love for lesser goods none of which can fulfil man’s deepest desire for God. 
 The ethical scheme of Purgatory is emphatically not, therefore, according to the teachings of 
philosophy (‘phylosophica documenta’).57  Rather, the end is love of God and neighbour (the two 
commandments by which Jesus sums up  the Divine Law), and the souls are directed from the 
earthly to the heavenly city.58 Indeed, as Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount counterpoises our earthly life 
with God’s kingdom, so, on Mount Purgatory, the beatitudes provide spiritual nourishment for the 
penitent souls and direct them to the eternal happiness in the life to come.59  As the philosopher 
Ralph McInerny, commenting on Dante’s use of the beatitudes, affirms: ‘Jesus begins his sermon 
with the beatitudes. One cannot think of a more dramatic way of showing that the New Law is not 
the Old Law, nor is it simply a repetition of the teaching of philosophers. The beatitudes fly in the 
face of our natural assumptions about human life [...] Far from being a distillation of natural moral 
wisdom, the Sermon on the Mount seems to stand natural wisdom on its head.’60  McInerny 
highlights the ‘enormous difference’ between ‘morality  or ethics – philosophical or natural accounts 
of how life should be led’ and ‘Christian revelation’, between the broadly philosophical 
organisation of Dante’s Inferno and the distinctively Christian ethics of the Purgatory.61 
 This ethical reorientation from the secular to the spiritual is evident from the first two 
terraces which purge the gravest vices of pride and envy: 
  ‘È chi, per esser suo vicin soppresso,
 spera eccellenza, e sol per questo brama
 ch’el sia di sua grandezza in basso messo;
  è chi podere, grazia, onore e fama
 teme di perder perch’altri sormonti,
 onde s’attrista sì che ’l contrario ama.’   (Purgatorio, xvii.115-20)
  [There are those who hope for supremacy through their neighbour’s being kept 
 down,  and only on this account desire that his greatness be brought low;
  there are those who fear to lose power, favour, honour, or fame because another 
 mounts higher, and thus are so aggrieved that they love the contrary.]
    
The proud pursue excellence not to magnify God like Mary but, rather, to exalt themselves and to 
put down their neighbour: the ‘superbus’ literally wants to walk above others (‘nam superbire non 
est aliud, quam super alios velle ire’).62 The envious are saddened by the excellence of others lest it 
diminish their own and, instead of desiring good for their neighbour (as Mary desires that there be 
more wine at the Marriage of Cana), they take pleasure (spite) in their neighbour’s failures and 
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misfortune. In both cases, the end is hatred of one’s neighbour. Crucially, the root of pride and envy 
is the competitive pursuit of temporal goods and status. Indeed, Dante links pride and envy  by 
listing four kinds of earthly things – power, favour or fortune, honour, and fame – by which people 
may measure themselves against others. As such temporal goods are finite, our own pursuit of them 
implies that our neighbour will have less (which may lead to pride: the desire to put down one’s 
neighbour) while our neighbour’s pursuit of them implies that we will have less (which may lead to 
envy: the sadness at one’s neighbour’s good). As Guido del Duca exclaims in the terrace of envy, ‘O 
gente umana perché poni ’l core / là ’v è mestier di consorte divieto?’ [O human race, why do you 
set your heart where sharing must be forbidden?].63 By contrast, spiritual goods multiply the more 
they  are shared. Thus truth, goodness, or love do not become less in being shared but, like a ray of 
light in a mirror, increase in each person.64 
 Freedom from these twin vices is only possible, therefore, when the soul is directed away 
from the competitive pursuit of secular attainments and, instead, towards God as its ultimate end. 
Having witnessed the proud souls punished bent over double by massive boulders, Dante exclaims:
  ‘O superbi cristian, miseri lassi
 che, de la vista de la mente infermi,
 fidanza avete ne’ retrosi passi,
  non v’accorgete voi che noi siam vermi
 nati a formar l’angelica farfalla
 che vola a la giustizia sanza schermi?
  Di che l’animo vostro in alto galla,
 poi siete quasi antomata in difetto,
 sì come vermo in cui formazion falla?’  (Purgatorio, x.121-29)
  [O proud Christians, weary wretches, who, weak in mental 
 vision, put your faith in backward steps,
  do you not perceive that we are worms born to form the 
 angelic butterfly that flies to justice without a shield?
  Why is it that your spirit floats on high, since you are like
 defective insects, like worms in whom formation is lacking?] 
Dante encounters Omberto Aldobrandesco who took pride in the past (his noble ancestors); 
Provenan Salvanti who took pride in the present (his political dominance of Siena) and Oderisi who 
took pride in the future (his artistic glory). All this pride is short-sighted – the proud are ‘weak in 
mental vision’ – because beyond the corruptible world in time (subject to past, present, and future) 
is the eternal perfection of the heavenly  city. As Sapia reminds Dante in the terrace of envy, she was 
only a pilgrim in Italy  because everyone is a citizen of the true city: ‘ciascuna è cittadina / d’una 
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vera città’.65 Christians, therefore, must not place their hope in earthly  prowess and happiness (their 
‘backward steps’).66  Nothing by which a person may puff himself up in this life will avail the 
immortal soul (the butterfly) which must leave its corruptible body (the chrysalis) at death and 
return to its creator for judgment. Men, pilgrims in this life, should thus fix their sight on their 
immortal destiny and fly  to God, rather than remain defective in the pride of the flesh (‘like worms 
in whom formation is lacking’).67
 The early commentators emphasise that Dante’s invective against  the ‘proud Christians’ 
underscores the fact that the realm of Purgatory (and the Christian pilgrimage of penitence in this 
life) is explicitly  unavailable to pagans.68 This ethical direction, furthermore, would be completely 
alien and irrational from a pagan perspective as its demands surpass, and contradict, the 
requirements of the natural law. When it comes to the disordered love of lesser goods (avarice, 
gluttony and lust), the souls in Purgatory are not directed to a virtuous mean as in natural ethics but 
to the supernatural ethical goals of poverty, abstinence and chastity. Furthermore, the souls’ ultimate 
goal is not intellectual contemplation of the truth (the speculative perfection of Aristotelian ethics) 
but, through embracing the cross and suffering of Christ, the union of the soul (intellect and will) 
with God in the beatific vision. 
 Notably, Virgil’s doctrinal speech at the centre of the canticle does not  give a specific 
explanation of the quiddity  of the three vices of excess ostensibly because it is good for Dante-
character, countering sloth, to discover it for himself.69 But this delay also allows Dante-poet, with 
typically caustic irony, to save the explanation of avarice for Pope Adrian V (Pope between 12th 
July and his death on 18th August 1276). The medieval papacy’s avaricious assumption of temporal 
power was, for Dante, the principal institutional cause of moral evil in the society of his own day, 
and it undermined his firm conviction that temporal and spiritual power should be divided between 
empire and Church. That a pope – whose exclusive duty, according to Dante, was to lead mankind 
to God (his spiritual goal) – should therefore be the mouthpiece for this most-worldly  vice plays 
into his contemporary  dualistic polemic. But it also serves an important moral purpose. For Adrian 
V, in Dante’s account, converted from unrelenting avarice to God only on assuming the papal 
throne! Only, that is, on reaching the highest  possible station attainable in the medieval world (the 
earthly city) does Adrian V recognise the vanity of temporal goods (that they cannot satisfy his 
desire) and begin to love the heavenly city: 
  ‘La mia conversïone, omè! fu tarda;
 ma, come fatto fui roman pastore,
 così scopersi la vita bugiarda.
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  Vidi che lì non s’acquetava il core,
 né più salir potiesi in quella vita
 per che di questa in me s’accese amore.
  Fino a quel punto misera e partita
 da Dio anima fui, del tutto avara;
 or, come vedi, qui ne son punita.’   (Purgatorio, xix.106-14)
  [My conversion, alas! was late, but, when I became 
 the Roman shepherd, then I discovered life to be deceptive.
  I saw that my heart was not quieted there, nor could I rise 
 any higher in that life: thus was kindled in me the love of this one.
  Until that point I was a wretched soul separated from God,
 entirely greedy; now, as you see, I am punished for it here.]
The message for the ordinary Christian is clear: even the highest power, wealth, and prestige (as 
achieved by a corrupt medieval pope) will not fulfil your desire.70  Rather, such temporal 
acquisitiveness will separate you from God (the true object of human desire) and lead to 
wretchedness. The further key point, equally for the institutional Church as for the individual 
Christian, is that  the way to God – the corresponding virtue to avarice – is not the prudent or just 
distribution of temporal goods (appropriate to the secular sphere of conduct) but, rather, radical 
temporal poverty. The souls are directed to the extreme poverty  of Mary: ‘Povera fosti tanto / 
quanto veder si può per quello ospizio / dove sponesti il tuo portato santo.’ [How very poor you 
were we can see by the shelter where you laid down your holy burden.]71 Poverty, to be spurned 
according to natural ethics, must be actively desired by those seeking the kingdom of Heaven. Pope 
Adrian V explains that  avarice had extinguished his love for every good: his soul, fixed down on 
earthly things (‘le cose terrene’), had been unable to taste heavenly  things (‘in alto’).72 By contrast, 
St Francis took Lady  Poverty as his bride opening up an ever increasing divine love: he was, as 
Dante states in Paradiso, seraphic in love (‘serafico in ardore’).73 
 The overarching Christian ethical re-direction from natural to supernatural ethics is further 
emphasised in the ensuing description of gluttony. In Hell, the blind intemperance of gluttony (the 
failure of reason to moderate the appetite to the food necessary for a person’s health) is eternally 
punished. In Purgatory, however, the souls are directed to a completely different moral order. The 
goal here is not bodily health (as a constituent of human flourishing) but, rather, holiness (‘qui si 
rifà santa’).74  The weeping souls sing the verse ‘Labïa mëa, Domine’ of the penitential psalm 
Miserere – their lips are directed from the satisfaction of sensual appetite to the praise of God (‘et 
os meum annuntiabit laudem tuam’). The souls in Purgatory endure an enforced fast: they circle a 
tree whose fruits, unreachable, nonetheless let off a powerful scent intensifying their hunger and 
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thirst. Their faces are so dark, hollow and wasted that the skin is shaped by their bones; their eye-
sockets are like rings without gems and, framing an emaciated nose, clearly  spell ‘omo’ [man].75 
This is hardly re-adjusting to the Aristotelian virtuous mean with regard to eating and drinking!76 
Rather this extreme bodily fasting leads the souls – entirely over and above the order of natural 
ethics – to spiritual union with Christ:
 
  ‘E non pur una volta, questo spazzo
 girando, si rinfresca nostra pena:
 io dico pena e dovria dir solazzo,
  ché quella voglia a li alberi ci mena
 che menò Cristo lieto a dire “Elì,”
 quando ne liberò con la sua vena.’   (Purgatorio, xxiii.70-75)
  [And not just once, as we circle this space, is our pain renewed:
 I say pain, and I should say solace,
  for that desire leads us to the tree that led Christ to say “Eli” gladly,
 when he freed us with the blood of his veins.]
Despite the extreme agony and the humiliation of the cross (according to his human nature), Christ 
joyfully cries ‘Eli’ (Father) and submits to the divine will because of his love for mankind 
(redeemed through his sacrifice). Likewise, the penitent  souls intensely  desire to come to the 
heavenly city  and, as the pain (their cross) is the means to their eternal salvation, it  is now – for 
them – solace.77 In Dante’s geographical symbolism, the penitents join themselves to Christ’s cross 
in Purgatory  at the exact antipodes of Jerusalem, the place of Christ’s crucifixion. It is Christ, 
therefore, who provides the moral order of Purgatory. The souls, inspired by  the promise of the 
beatitudes and embracing their penitential suffering, are made ready for the kingdom of God. And 
these souls in Purgatory  are explicitly compared to pilgrims (‘i peregrin pensosi’) who, in this life, 
must do penance of abstinence and fasting for the sake of the heavenly kingdom.78
 The ethical scheme of Dante’s Purgatory is, therefore, distinctively Christian. The new law 
of the beatitudes which governs Purgatory  stands natural ethics on its head. The souls in Purgatory 
are explicitly directed away from secular, this-worldly goods or aspirations. Instead, the souls are 
exhorted to embrace the higher demands of Christ’s law which may involve practices, such as 
extreme poverty or fasting, which completely surpass the philosophical rule of the virtuous mean. 
I have argued that the interpretation of a ‘Political Purgatory’ in terms of philosophical principles 
represents a false turning in twentieth-century Dante scholarship. The motivation for such a reading, 
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at least  in part, is the desire to interpret  the poem through Dante’s dualistic theory. Scholars who 
equate the secular, this-worldly goal described in the Monarchia with the earthly  paradise at the 
summit of Purgatory naturally  seek to equate the philosophical guidance described in the 
Monarchia with the ethics of the Purgatory. The first  step in my argument, therefore, has been to 
dispute such a dualistic reading. In itself, this is not particularly new. After all, many  scholars have 
considered that  such a parallel is mistaken. But, in contrast to them, I have not thereby concluded 
that there is no evidence of Dante’s dualistic theory in the Commedia, a conclusion that is all but 
untenable if, as the modern philological evidence suggests, there was no radical shift in Dante’s 
intellectual trajectory away from this theory  by the time he wrote the Commedia. Rather, I have 
presented an alternative way  to read the poem in dualistic terms. I have argued that Dante, with 
characteristic ingenuity, surmounts the apparent impossibility  of representing a this-worldly  goal in 
a poem that depicts an other-worldly afterlife by using the virtuous pagan to figuratively represent 
secular human flourishing. The theologically original limbo of the virtuous pagans represents the 
journey  by philosophical teaching to moral and intellectual flourishing in this life. By  contrast, 
Purgatory represents the spiritual journey  to an eternal beatitude (beatitudo vitae aeternae). The 
immediate Christian context of Dante’s depiction of Purgatory  re-enforces this reading. The use of 
the moral structure of the seven capital vices in thirteenth-century penitential practice served 
perfectly  the literal and moral purpose of Dante’s Purgatory: it literally  describes the temporal 
punishment and purification of saved souls after death, and it allegorically  represents the spiritual 
penance which must be undergone by all Christians on their pilgrimage to God in this life. The 
moral order of Dante’s Purgatory is distinctively Christian and outside the purview of philosophical 
principles and, thereby, further confirms this interpretation. The souls in Purgatory are directed from 
the secular goal of natural ethics to the supernatural goal of the heavenly city; from the virtuous 
mean to the demands of supernatural law. A revised dualistic interpretation of the poem as a whole, 
an examination of the immediate contexts of Dante’s vision of Purgatory, and a re-reading of its 
moral order, therefore, not only  serve to counter an interpretation of the Purgatory in terms of 
philosophical principles, but also provide powerful arguments for upholding the traditional 
interpretation of the region in terms of Christian ethics.
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44 Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215/16), ‘Omnis utriusque sexus’ commands every Christian to confess his 
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See Siegfried Wenzel, ‘Dante’s Rationale for the Seven Deadly Sins’ in Modern Language Review, 60 (1965), 529-33. 
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